Chapter 22

Formal Proof of Explanation

Proving correct a complex object like the WB-Graph we have developed based on the specifications of Chapter 16 requires the use of a strict proof scheme. Without a systematic approach it is difficult to maintain the overview over the proof. We decided to use a hierarchical proof scheme, allowing the systematic decomposition into substeps, which can be proved separately. This allows the development of proof templates (section A) we will use for the proof of the graph.

22.1 The Hierarchical Proof-scheme

The principle we use to decompose the proof into substeps is *inverse natural deduction*. We try to find proof-steps, which we can assume to be correct for the current step. So we can complete the current step under this assumption and prove the correctness of these proof-steps later on.

To find these steps is straight forward in our case. Since we wish to prove the correctness of a WB-graph, the structure of the proof is directly given by the structure of the graph. All we need to do is to prove the completeness and correctness for the internal nodes of the graph (see figure 22.1).




Figure 22.1: (a) Structure of the intuitive WB-Graph and (b) resulting Proof Structure




Figure 22.2: (a) Structure of the proved WB-Graph and (b) resulting Proof Structure

During the proof, we determined inaccuracies in the intuitive WB-Graph presented in Figure 17.4. It was necessary to implement several changes and eventually we got the graph shown in figure 22.5.

Similar to the hierarchical specifications we presented in chapter 16, we split the proof into several modules. Each module contains one of the proof-steps illustrated in figure 22.2 (b). The proof-steps are formulated as theorems. We formulate the main theorem –"WB-Graph is causally sufficient" – in a top-level module and include the subproofs as shown in figure 22.3.

22.2 Sufficient Causal Explanation Proof

In the following sections we will present the modules – and their proofs – used to state the top-level theorem in figure 22.3. Furthermore, we will formulate the assumptions we made during the proof in module *Proof-Obligations* (section 22.2.10). In the final section of this chapter we will present the textual and pictorial form of the causally sufficient explained WB-Graph.

22.2.1 Proof of [1]

For a better readability we write down the used WB-graph nodes before we present the proof steps. There is no formal need to do so!

```
[1] /* AC lands at Brussels RWY 25 */
[11] /* CRW opts to continue landing */
⟨12⟩ /* AC near Brussels Airport */
```

module /1/_is_explained_causally_sufficient

```
VARIABLES
```

```
extends Landing_Specs
extends PARDIA—Axioms
extends PARDIA—Norms
CONSTANTS CRW, AC, BRU, APPR
```

```
 \begin{array}{ll} \textit{Hypotheses} & \triangleq & \land [11] \\ & \land \land \langle 12 \rangle \\ \textit{Procedures} & \triangleq & \land \textit{Landing\_Specs.Spec} \\ & \land \textit{PARDIA-Axioms.Spec} \\ & \land \textit{PARDIA-Norms.Spec} \end{array}
```

THEOREM (Hypotheses \land Procedures) $\Box \Rightarrow \Diamond [1]$

 $\langle 1 \rangle 1$. [11] $\Leftrightarrow \land Decide(CRW, \Box(AC)in_landing_phase)$

Proof:

```
\wedge \Box \neg distress\_decl(CRW)
                  \wedge \Box \neg urgency\_decl(CRW)
                  \wedge \Box (AC)in\_landing\_phase
Proof:
   Interpretation: we take "opts to continue" to mean "decides to continue and acts successfully
   to continue" which we formulate as a state pedicate.
\langle 1 \rangle 2. \langle 12 \rangle \Leftrightarrow (AC)near(BRU)
Proof:
    We interpret \langle 12 \rangle as a state predicate.
\langle 1 \rangle 3. \ (Hypotheses \land Procedures) \Longrightarrow \Diamond [1]
PROOF:
    \langle 2 \rangle 1. Hypotheses
   Proof:
        \langle 3 \rangle 1. [11]
       Proof:
           [11] under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 1 is true from the sources.
        \langle 3 \rangle 2. \langle 12 \rangle
       PROOF:
           \langle 12 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 2 is true from the sources.
           Follows by (\land - intro) from \langle 3 \rangle 1, and \langle 3 \rangle 2.
    \langle 2 \rangle 2. Procedures
```

```
Proof:
     We assume that Landing_Specs.Spec, PARDIA-Axioms.Spec and PARDIA-Norms.Spec
     hold.
\langle 2 \rangle 3. \ (Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \succ \Diamond [1]
PROOF:
      \langle 3 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA}(Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \Rightarrow \Diamond [1]
     Proof:
          (4)1.  \begin{pmatrix} \land & Decide(CRW, \Box(AC)in\_landing\_phase) \\ \land & (AC)near(BRU) \\ \land & \Box Landing\_Specs.Spec \\ \land & \Box PARDIA-Norms.Spec \\ \land & \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec \end{pmatrix} 
           PROOF:
                ROOF:  \langle 5 \rangle 1. \left( \begin{array}{c} \wedge & Decide(CRW, \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase) \\ \wedge & \Box PARDIA-Norms.Spec \\ \wedge & \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec \\ \end{array} \right) \leadsto \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase  PROOF:  \langle 6 \rangle 1. \left( \begin{array}{c} \wedge & Decide(CRW, \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase) \\ \wedge & \Box PARDIA-Norms.Spec \\ \end{array} \right) \leadsto   \sim Intend(CRW, \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase) 
                      Proof:
                      This is PARDIA-Norms.N3. \langle 6 \rangle 2. \left( \begin{array}{cc} \wedge & Indend(CRW, \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase) \\ \wedge & \Box PARDIA - Norms.Spec \end{array} \right) \sim
                                  \rightarrow Act(CRW, \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase)
                      Proof:
                           This is PARDIA-Norms.N4.

Act(CRW, \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase) \Rightarrow \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase
Act(CRW, \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase) \Rightarrow \Box(AC)\_in\_landing\_phase
                            Since \Box(AC)_in_landing_phase is a state predicate, this follows from Axiom
                            PARDIA-Axioms. A 10.
                      \langle 6 \rangle 4. Q.E.D.
                      Proof:
                           Follows by temporal logic from \langle 6 \rangle 1, \langle 6 \rangle 2 and \langle 6 \rangle 3.

\begin{pmatrix} \wedge & \Box (AC)\_in\_landing\_phase \\ \wedge & (AC)near(BRU) \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow (AC)\_lands\_at(BRU)
                PROOF:
                      This is an Axiom (Landing_Specs.LandingRule)!
                 \langle 5 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
                      Follows by propositional logic from \langle 5 \rangle 1 and \langle 5 \rangle 2.
           \langle 4 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
                Follows by definition of strict implication (inference rule 14.21). \square
\langle 2 \rangle 4. \Leftrightarrow [1]
Proof:
     This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
\langle 2 \rangle 5. Q.E.D.
     Directly follows by Inference Rule 15.7 from \langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 2 \rangle 2, \langle 2 \rangle 3 and \langle 2 \rangle 4. \square
```

22.2.2 Proof of [11]

Nodes used in the following module:

```
/* CRW opts to continue landing */
```

- /* CRW realizes they are landing at the wrong airport */ $\lceil 111 \rceil$
- /* CRW has safety reasons for continuing landing */ $\langle 112 \rangle$
- $\langle 113 \rangle$ /* Standard Operating Procedures */

- f module |11|_is_explained_causally_sufficient -

DECLARATIONS

extends PARDIA-Axioms

extends PARDIA-Norms

instance Landing_Specs

instance Landing_Norms

instance Phases

Constants CRW, AC, TFC

$$Hypotheses \triangleq \land [111] \\ \land \langle 112 \rangle$$

$$Procedures \triangleq \langle 112 \rangle$$

 $Procedures \triangleq$ $\langle 113 \rangle$

THEOREM
$$\begin{pmatrix} \land & Hypotheses \\ \land & \Box Procedures \\ \land & \Box Phases.Decision \\ \land & [11] \end{pmatrix} \Box \Rightarrow [11]$$

PROOF:

$$\langle 1 \rangle 1. \ \langle 111 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \wedge \ Reason(CRW, APT \neq destAPT) \\ \wedge \ (AC)near(APT)$$

PROOF:

We interpret $\langle 111 \rangle$ as the corresponding reasoning by the crew.

$$\langle 1 \rangle 2. \ \langle 112 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \begin{pmatrix} \land \ Reason(CRW, (\lozenge \neg (AC)in_landing_phase \Rightarrow endanger(CRW, TFC))) \\ \land \ \Box \neg distress_decl(CRW) \\ \land \ \Box \neg urgency_decl(CRW) \\ \land \ \Box (AC)in_landing_phase \end{pmatrix}$$

PROOF:

We interpret $\langle 112 \rangle$ as a state predicate. We interpret the phrase 'reasons for continuing landing' as indicating not only that they had reasons, but also successfully continued, without declaring urgency or emergency.

$$\langle 1 \rangle$$
3. $\langle 113 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \land PARDIA_Norms.Spec$
 $\land PARDIA_Axioms.Spec$
 $\land Landing_Specs.Spec$
 $\land Landing_Norms.LNSpec$

PROOF:

We consider the SOPs for this case to be described sufficiently by our specifications PARDIA_Norms.Spec, PARDIA_Axioms.Spec and landing_specs.Spec.

$$\langle 1 \rangle 4. \ [11] \Leftrightarrow \land \ Decide(CRW, \Box(AC)in_landing_phase) \\ \land \ \Box \neg distress_decl(CRW) \\ \land \ \Box \neg urgency_decl(CRW) \\ \land \ \Box(AC)in_landing_phase$$

PROOF:

Interpretation: we take "opts to continue" to mean "decides to continue and acts

successfully to continue
$$\langle 1 \rangle 5. \begin{pmatrix} \wedge & Hypotheses \\ \wedge & \Box Procedures \\ \wedge & \Box Phases.Decision \\ \wedge & [11] \end{pmatrix} \quad \Box \Rightarrow [11]$$

 $\langle 2 \rangle 1$. Hypotheses

Proof:

 $\langle 3 \rangle 1. [111]$

Proof:

Under the interpretation of $\langle 1 \rangle 1$ we consider the truth of [111] to be stated in the sources.

 $\langle 3 \rangle 2. \langle 112 \rangle$

Proof:

Under the interpretation of $\langle 1 \rangle$ 2 we consider the truth of $\langle 112 \rangle$ to be stated in the sources.

 $\langle 3 \rangle 3$. Q.E.D.

PROOF:

Follows immediately by /intro

 $\langle 2 \rangle 2$. (Hypotheses $\land \Box Procedures$) $\succ \bot$

PROOF:

 $\langle 3 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA}(Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \Rightarrow \bot$

PROOF:

PROOF:
$$\langle 4 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA} \begin{pmatrix} \land Landing_Specs.Spec \\ \land Landing_Norms.Normal_Progress \\ \land Landing_Norms.Landing_Procedures \\ \land \Box (AC)in_landing_phase \\ \land \Box \neg distress_decl(CRW) \\ \land \Box \neg urgency_decl(CRW) \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \bot$$
PROOF:
$$\langle 5 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA} \begin{pmatrix} \land Landing_Specs.Spec \\ \land Landing_Norms.Landing_Procedures \\ \land \Box (AC)in_landing_phase \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \Diamond (AC)lands_at(APT)$$
PROOF:

$$\langle 5 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA} \left(\begin{array}{ccc} \land & Landing_Specs.Spec \\ \land & Landing_Norms.Landing_Procedures \\ \land & \Box(AC)in_landing_phase \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \Diamond(AC)lands_at(APT)$$

$$\langle 6 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA} \left(\begin{array}{c} \land \quad (AC)near(APT) \\ \land \quad \land (AC)near(APT) \\ \quad \land \quad \Box (AC)in_landing_phase \\ \land \quad \Box (AC)in_landing_phase \\ \diamond (AC)lands_at(APT) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \\ \diamond (AC)lands_at(APT)$$

PROOF:

Follows immediately by propositional logic

 $\langle 6 \rangle 2$. Q.E.D.

Proof:

Follows immediately by propositional logic from $\langle 6 \rangle 1$ upon observing that (AC)near(APT) is a conjunct of $\langle 111 \rangle$.

$$\langle 5 \rangle 2. \vdash_{TLA} \left(\begin{matrix} \land & Landing_Norms.Normal_Progress \\ \land & APT \neq destAPT \\ \land & \Box \neg distress_decl(CRW) \\ \land & \Box \neg urgency_decl(CRW) \end{matrix} \right) \Rightarrow \neg \Diamond (AC)lands_at(APT)$$

PROOF:

Immediate by propositional logic using the definition of $Landing_Norms.Normal_Progress.$ $\langle 5 \rangle 3$. Q.E.D.

Follows immediately by propositional logic from $\langle 5 \rangle 1$ and $\langle 5 \rangle 2$

 $\langle 4 \rangle 2$. Q.E.D.

Follows immediately by propositional logic by inspection of the constituent clauses

 $\langle 3 \rangle 2$. Q.E.D.

Follows by Inference Rule 14.21.

 $\langle 2 \rangle 3$. Hypotheses $\succ (AC)$ in Landing phase

The consequent is a conjunct of $\langle 112 \rangle$.

 $\langle 2 \rangle 4. 11$

This is stated in the sources.

 $\langle 2 \rangle 5$. Q.E.D.

Follows immediately from $\langle 2 \rangle 1$, $\langle 2 \rangle 2$, $\langle 2 \rangle 3$ and $\langle 2 \rangle 4$ by EL-Rule 19.10. \square

22.2.3 Proof of [111]

Nodes used in the following module:

 $\langle 3 \rangle 2$. $\neg \{1112\} \Box \rightarrow \neg [111]$

Proof:

```
/* Crew (CRW) realizes they are landing at the wrong airport */
        \lceil 111 \rceil
                   /* CRW gets visual contact to Brussels airport */
       \lceil 11111 \rceil
       {1112}
                   /* CRW notices that Brussels' airport layout is different from Frankfurt's */
                               module [111]_is_explained_causally_sufficient
  THEOREM ([1111] \land \{1112\}) \Longrightarrow [111]
     Proof:
\langle 1 \rangle 1. \langle 111 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \land Reason(CRW, APT \neq destAPT)
                   \wedge (AC)near(APT)
Proof:
   We interpret \langle 111 \rangle as the corresponding reasoning by the crew.
\langle 1 \rangle 2. ([1111] \land \{1112\}) \Longrightarrow [111]
    \langle 2 \rangle 1. [1111] \Rightarrow [111]
   Proof:
       \langle 3 \rangle 1. [1111] \wedge [111]
       PROOF:
          \langle 4 \rangle 1. [1111]
          Proof: This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
          PROOF: This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
          \langle 4 \rangle3. Q.E.D.
              (\wedge-introduction) from \langle 4 \rangle 1 and \langle 4 \rangle 2.
       \langle 3 \rangle 2. \neg [1111] \Box \rightarrow \neg [111]
       PROOF:
          The CRW did not realize their wrong position earlier although sufficient hints were
          available. Given that instruments providing the information necessary to determine
          the position without visual contact were ignored, the only other way to obtain this
          information is visual contact. The theorem follows by modus tollens.
       \langle 3 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
          Directly follows by Inference Rule 14.20 from \langle 3 \rangle 1 and \langle 3 \rangle 2.
    \langle 2 \rangle 2. \{1112\} \Rightarrow [111]
   PROOF:
       \langle 3 \rangle 1. \{1112\} \wedge [111]
      PROOF:
          \langle 4 \rangle 1. \{1112\}
          PROOF: This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
          PROOF: This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
          \langle 4 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
              (\wedge-introduction) from \langle 4 \rangle 1 and \langle 4 \rangle 2.
```

Apart from technical means which were earlier ignored or at least misinterpreted by the CRW the only way to differentiate between airports is to compare their layouts. Given that the evidence of the instruments was ignored, if they hadn't recognized the layout they saw was different from the expected (flight documents contain 2D maps of the destination airport) they wouldn't have recognized their mistake at that time. (3)3. Q.E.D.

Directly follows by Inference Rule 14.20 from $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ and $\langle 3 \rangle 2$. \square

 $\langle 2 \rangle 3. \neg [111] \rightarrow \neg ([1111] \land \{1112\})$

Given that no use of evidence from instrumentation was made, if neither [1111] nor {1112} then no evident was available that could call their attention to the wrong airport.

 $\langle 2 \rangle 4$. Q.E.D.

Follows by definition of " $\Box \Rightarrow$ " and from steps $\langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 2 \rangle 2$ and $\langle 2 \rangle 3.$

Proof of [1111] 22.2.4

Nodes used in the following module:

```
/* CRW gets visual contact to Brussels airport */
 [1111]
[11111]
            /* AC breaks out under clouds */
\langle 11112 \rangle
            /* CRW procedures */
            /* AC near Brussels Airport */
  \langle 12 \rangle
  \langle 2 \rangle
            /* AC in BATC area */
    ullet module [1111]_is_explained_causally_sufficient ullet
```

VARIABLES

```
extends Landing_Specs
extends Naturals
extends RealTime
RTT \triangleq instance RealTimeTheorems
              with lower\_bound \leftarrow TDZE,
                     upper\_bound \leftarrow current\_alt,
                     f \leftarrow alt
Constants AC, ATC, CRW, APT, TFC, APPR
Variables alt
```

```
Hypotheses \triangleq \land [11111]
                                  \wedge \langle 12 \rangle
                                  \wedge \langle 2 \rangle
Procedures \triangleq
                                \langle 11112 \rangle
```

ASSUMPTIONS

```
ASSUMPTION1 \triangleq DH \in (TDZE, alt]
```

```
THEOREM (Hypotheses \land Procedures) \Longrightarrow \diamondsuit[1111]
```

```
Proof:
```

```
\langle 1 \rangle 1. [11111] \Leftrightarrow below\_clouds(AC)
PROOF:
   We interpret [11111] as a state predicate.
\langle 1 \rangle 2. \langle 12 \rangle \Leftrightarrow (AC)near(APT)
Proof:
    We interpret \langle 12 \rangle as a state predicate.
\langle 1 \rangle 3. \langle 2 \rangle \Leftrightarrow (AC)in\_area(atc)
    We interpret \langle 2 \rangle as a state predicate.
\langle 1 \rangle 4. \langle 11112 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \wedge ILS\_approach(AC, APT)
                         \land \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW)
    As described below, a part of the procedures (i.e. ILS\_approach(AC, APT) and
   \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW)) are sufficient for our needs.
```

```
\langle 1 \rangle 5. (Hypotheses \land Procedures) \Box \Rightarrow \Diamond [1111]
    \langle 2 \rangle 1. Hypotheses
    Proof:
          \langle 3 \rangle 1. [11111]
         PROOF:
               [11111] under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 1 is true from the sources.
          \langle 3 \rangle 2. \langle 12 \rangle
         Proof:
               \langle 12 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 2 is true from the sources.
          \langle 3 \rangle 3. \langle 2 \rangle
         Proof:
               \langle 2 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 3 is true from the sources.
          \langle 3 \rangle 4. Q.E.D.
               \wedge-intro from \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2 and \langle 3 \rangle 3.
     \langle 2 \rangle 2. Procedures
    Proof:
          \langle 3 \rangle 1. \langle 11112 \rangle
         Proof:
               \langle 11112 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 4 is true from the sources.
     \langle 2 \rangle 3. \ (Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \succ \Diamond [1111]
    PROOF:
          \langle 3 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA}(Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \Rightarrow \Diamond [1111]
         PROOF:
               We intend to reformulate this expression in logic. Formulation of the goal
               \langle 4 \rangle 1. [1111] \Leftrightarrow \Diamond visual\_contact(CRW, APT)
                    Interpretation: [1111] corresponds to a state predicate.
               as well as use of the logical equivalents defined above results in:
               \langle 4 \rangle 2. \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \land & below\_clouds(AC) \\ \land & (AC)near(BRU\_APT) \\ \land & (AC)in\_area(atc) \\ \land & \Box \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \land & ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \land & \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \Diamond visual\_contact(CRW,APT) 
                    \langle 5 \rangle 1. \diamond \Box visual\_contact(CRW, APT) \Rightarrow \diamond visual\_contact(CRW, APT)
                    PROOF:
                         Derivable from TLA-Rules.
                                    \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \wedge & \Box ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \wedge & \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \\ \wedge & \Diamond \Box \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \wedge & ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \wedge & below\_DH \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \Diamond \Box visual\_contact(CRW,APT) 
                    Proof:
                          \langle 6 \rangle 1. \left( \begin{array}{cc} \wedge & \Box ILS\_approach(AC, APT) \\ \wedge & \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \Diamond \Box visibility\_acceptable(CRW)
```

```
With:
                     A \triangleq \land ILS\_approach(AC, APT)
                                    \wedge \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW)
                      B \triangleq below\_DH
                      C \triangleq \Box visibility\_acceptable(CRW) and Propositional Logic this is
                     ILS - APPR\_rule.
                 \langle 10 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
                Proof:
                     Follows from \langle 10 \rangle 1 by STL4 (\Diamond-Form). \square
           \langle 9 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
          Proof:
                Follows by Propositional Logic from \langle 9 \rangle 1 and \langle 9 \rangle 2.
      \langle 8 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
          Derivable from \langle 8 \rangle 1 by \langle 8 \rangle 2 with:
           A \triangleq \land ILS\_approach(AC, APT)
                         \wedge \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW)
           B \triangleq below\_DH
           C \triangleq \Box visibility\_acceptable(CRW). \Box
 \langle 7 \rangle 2. \ \left( \begin{array}{cc} \wedge & \Box ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \wedge & \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \Diamond below\_DH 
Proof:
      \begin{array}{l} \text{ROOF:} \\ \langle 8 \rangle 1. & \left( \begin{array}{c} \wedge & \Box ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \wedge & \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \end{array} \right) \\ \Rightarrow \forall \, x \in [TDZE, current\_alt] : \Diamond alt = x \end{array} 
                       \left(\begin{array}{cc} \land & \Box ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \land & \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \end{array}\right) \Rightarrow \Diamond landing
          PROOF:
                This is an Axiom (ILS - LandingRule)!
                        \left(\begin{array}{cc} \land & \Box ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \land & \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \end{array}\right) \Rightarrow \left(\begin{array}{c} alt \ is \ a \ 'monotone \ decreasing \\ continuous \ function \ of \ RealTime' \end{array}\right)
          Proof:
                This is an Axiom (ILS - AltProperty)!
                        \left(\begin{array}{c} \textit{alt is a 'monotone decreasing'} \\ \textit{continuous function of RealTime'} \end{array}\right) \Rightarrow \frac{\delta \; \textit{alt}}{\delta t} < 0 \; \textit{in} \; [\textit{TDZE}, \textit{current\_alt}]
          Proof:
                This is the definition of a 'decreasing continuous function'.
                     \begin{array}{l} \delta \cdot \delta \cdot \frac{\delta \cdot alt}{\delta t} < 0 \ in \ [TDZE, current\_alt] \\ \wedge \quad alt = current\_alt \\ \wedge \quad \diamond (alt = TZDE) \end{array} 
                       \Rightarrow \forall x \in [TDZE, current\_alt] : \diamond alt = x
          Proof:
                This is RTT.MeanValueTheorem.
           \langle 9 \rangle 5. Q.E.D.
          Proof:
                Follows by Propositional Logic from \langle 9 \rangle 1, \langle 9 \rangle 2, \langle 9 \rangle 3
                   \left(\begin{array}{cc} \land \ \forall x \in [TDZE, current\_alt] : \Diamond alt = x \\ \land \ ASSUMPTION1 \end{array}\right) \Rightarrow \Diamond below\_DH
     PROOF:
```

```
Follows immediatly from Calculus and definition of below_DH.
              \langle 8 \rangle 3. \Leftrightarrow \Box below\_DH \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow below\_DH
              Proof:
                   Derivable by TLA-Rules.
               ⟨8⟩4. Q.E.D.
              Proof:
                   Follows from \langle 8 \rangle 1, \langle 8 \rangle 2 and \langle 8 \rangle 3 by Propositional Logic. \square
         \langle 7 \rangle3. Q.E.D.
         Proof:
              Follows from \langle 7 \rangle 1 and \langle 7 \rangle 2 by Propositional Logic.
     \begin{array}{l} \langle 6 \rangle 2. \ \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \wedge & \Diamond \Box visibility\_acceptable(CRW) \\ \wedge & \Diamond \Box \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \wedge & ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \wedge & below\_DH \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \Diamond \Box visual\_contact(CRW,APT) \\ \end{array} 
    Proof:
         \langle 7 \rangle 1. \  \, \Diamond \Box \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \land & \textit{visibility\_acceptable}(\textit{CRW}) \\ \land & \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \land & \textit{ILS\_approach}(\textit{AC}, \textit{APT}) \\ \land & \textit{below\_DH} \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \Diamond \Box \textit{visual\_contact}(\textit{CRW}, \textit{APT}) 
        PROOF:
             PROOF:
                   \langle 9 \rangle 1. \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \land & visibility\_acceptable(CRW) \\ \land & \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \land & ILS\_approach(AC,APT) \\ \land & below\_DH \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow visual\_contact(CRW,APT) 
                       \langle 10 \rangle 1. \begin{pmatrix} \land & visibility\_acceptable(CRW) \\ \land & \lor \land ILS\_approach(AC, APT) \\ & \land below\_DH \\ & \lor \land NPA\_approach(AC, APT) \\ & \land at\_MDA \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow visual\_contact(CRW, APT)
                        Proof:
                             This is an Axiom (Landing_Criterion).
                        \langle 10 \rangle 2. ILS\_approach(AC, APT) \Leftrightarrow \neg NPA\_approach(AC, APT)
                             This is an Axiom (Unique\_Approach - Type\_Rule).
                        \langle 10 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
                             Follows from \langle 10 \rangle 1 and \langle 10 \rangle 2 by Propositional Logic. \square
                   \langle 9 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
                        Follows immediately from STL4.
              \langle 8 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
                   Follows immediately from STL4 (\diamond-Form). \sqcup
         \langle 7 \rangle2. Q.E.D.
              Follows immediately from STL6. \square
    \langle 6 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
         Follows by Propositional Logic from \langle 6 \rangle 1 and \langle 6 \rangle 2.
\langle 5 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
    Follows by Propositional Logic (transitivity of implication) from \langle 5 \rangle 1 and \langle 5 \rangle 2.
```

```
\langle 4 \rangle3. Q.E.D.
              Follows from steps \langle 4 \rangle 1 and \langle 4 \rangle 2. \Box
    \langle 3 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
         Follows by definition of strict implication (inference rule 14.21). \square
\langle 2 \rangle 4. \Leftrightarrow [1111]
Proof:
    This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
\langle 2 \rangle 5. \neg \Diamond [1111] \Box \rightarrow \neg (Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures)
Proof:
    \langle 3 \rangle 1. \ \Box \neg visual\_contact(CRW, APT) \Box \rightarrow \left( \begin{array}{c} \lor \ \neg below\_clouds(AC) \\ \lor \ \neg (AC)near(APT) \\ \lor \ \neg (AC)in\_area(atc) \\ \lor \ \neg \Box \left( \begin{array}{c} \land \ ILS\_approach(AC, APT) \\ \land \ \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \end{array} \right) 
    Proof:
         We argue that in the nearest possible world,
                                                   \neg \Box \left( \begin{array}{cc} \land & ILS\_approach(AC, APT) \\ \land & \Box \neg CRW\_breakoff(CRW) \end{array} \right)
         is the least possible alternative. Under this assumption, \neg below\_clouds(AC), \neg(AC)near(APT)
         or \neg(AC) in_area(atc) would all lead to \neg visual\_contact(CRW, APT).
     \langle 3 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
         Follows by Propositional Logic, STL2 and STL3 as well as use of definitions from \langle 2 \rangle 1
         and \langle 2 \rangle 2.
\langle 2 \rangle 6. Q.E.D.
    Directly follows by Inference Rule 15.7 from \langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 2 \rangle 2, \langle 2 \rangle 3, \langle 2 \rangle 4 and \langle 2 \rangle 5. \Box
```

22.2.5 Proof of Node 12

Nodes used in the following module:

```
/* AC near Brussels Airport */
           \langle 12 \rangle
           (121)
                      /* CRW did not realize that they were on wrong course, UNTIL:[111] */
           \langle 122 \rangle
                     /* AC cleared to BATC according to ATC procedures */
                                 - module \langle 12 \rangle_is_explained_causally_sufficient -
   THEOREM ((121) \land \langle 122 \rangle) \Longrightarrow \langle 12 \rangle
PROOF:
\langle 1 \rangle 1. ((121) \land \langle 122 \rangle) \Longrightarrow \langle 12 \rangle
    \langle 2 \rangle 1. (121) \Rightarrow \langle 12 \rangle
   Proof:
        \langle 3 \rangle 1. (121) \wedge \langle 12 \rangle
       Proof:
           \langle 4 \rangle 1. \ (121)
           PROOF: This is assumed in the sources and can be derived from the CRW's behavior.
           PROOF: This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
           \langle 4 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
               (\land-introduction) from \langle 4 \rangle 1 and \langle 4 \rangle 2.
        \langle 3 \rangle 2. \neg (121) \Box \rightarrow \neg \langle 12 \rangle
       Proof:
           The flight destination was Frankfurt. If they had realized they were on the wrong
           course, they would likely have taken actions to return to the course they were supposed
           to be on unless other more pressing considerations intervened. This is exactly what the
           counterfactual says.
        \langle 3 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
           Directly follows by Inference Rule 14.20 from \langle 3 \rangle 1 and \langle 3 \rangle 2.
    \langle 2 \rangle 2. \langle 122 \rangle \Rightarrow \langle 12 \rangle
   Proof:
        \langle 3 \rangle 1. \langle 122 \rangle \wedge \langle 12 \rangle
       Proof:
           \langle 4 \rangle 1. \langle 122 \rangle
           PROOF: We assume this from facts given in the sources.
           \langle 4 \rangle 2. \langle 12 \rangle
           PROOF: This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
           \langle 4 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
               (\land-introduction) from \langle 4 \rangle 1 and \langle 4 \rangle 2.
        \langle 3 \rangle 2. \ \neg \langle 122 \rangle \square \rightarrow \neg \langle 12 \rangle
       Proof:
           We consider, that in the nearest possible world the SOPs are followed. In this particular
           case we assume that an AC only enters a specific area when it has obtained an ATC
           clearance before. Therefore without a clearance to BATC area the AC will not be able
           to get into Brussels Airport area.
        \langle 3 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
           Directly follows by Inference Rule 14.20 from \langle 3 \rangle 1 and \langle 3 \rangle 2.
```

 $\langle 2 \rangle 3. \ \neg \langle 12 \rangle \square \rightarrow \neg ((121) \land \langle 122 \rangle)$

In the nearest possible world they had not been near Brussels airport, since their destination was Frankfurt. Because their flightpath in that case had led from LATC area to MATC area they weren't supposed to be cleared to BATC.

Since they are assumed to follow the SOPs in the nearest possible world, they would have realized hints about a possible wrong course.

 $\langle 2 \rangle 4$. Q.E.D.

Follows by definition of " \Longrightarrow " and from steps $\langle 2 \rangle 1$ and $\langle 2 \rangle 3$.

22.2.6 Proof of (121)

Nodes used in the following module:

```
/* CRW did not realize that they were on wrong course, UNTIL:[111] */
     (121)
               /* CRW addresses BATC controller as "Frankfurt" several times */
    {1211}
               /* ILS has different frequency for Frankfurt. */
    \langle 1212 \rangle
               /* CRW asks for the Bruno VOR's frequency. */
    [1213]
               /* Brussels did not question the addressing error although it happened more than once */
    (1214)
    (1215)
               /* Situation remains safe during landing */
              /* Current approach plates are used */
    \langle 1216 \rangle
                        m- module (121)_is_explained_causally_sufficient -
VARIABLES
  extends PARDIA-Axioms
  extends PARDIA-Norms
  extends Landing_Specs
  CONSTANTS CRW, AC, ATC, BATC, BRU, FRA, this_approach, freq
  Hupotheses \triangleq \land \{1211\}
                    \wedge \langle 1212 \rangle
                    \wedge [1213]
                     \wedge (1214)
                     \wedge \langle 1215 \rangle
                    \wedge \langle 1216 \rangle
  Procedures \triangleq \land PARDIA-Axioms.Spec
                    \land Landing\_Specs.Spec
  THEOREM (Hypotheses \land Procedures) \Box \Rightarrow \Diamond (121)
```

Proof:

```
\langle 1 \rangle 1. \{1211\} \Leftrightarrow Perceive(BATC, addressing\_error(CRW, BATC))
PROOF:
```

We claim, that the addressing error has not only been made but must also have been perceived, since this information wouldn't be in the sources otherwise.

 $\langle 1 \rangle 2. \langle 1212 \rangle \Leftrightarrow Attend(CRW, data_inconsist(appr_plate[this_approach][LOC[freq]], appr_plate[FRA][LOC[freq]]))$

Proof:

Since mentioned in the sources, the CRW must at least have paid attention to the fact of inconsistent data.

```
\langle 1 \rangle 3. \ [1213] \Leftrightarrow Attend(CRW, BrunoVor[freq] \not\in Navaids[appr\_plate[this\_approach]]) PROOF:
```

From the fact, they asked for the Bruno VOR frequency, we can derive, that they at least attended that this information was not presented in the approach plate they used.

```
\langle 1 \rangle 4.~(1214) \Leftrightarrow \neg question(BATC, CRW, addressing\_error(CRW, BATC)) PROOF:
```

```
We interpret (1214) as a state predicate.
\langle 1 \rangle 5. \langle 1215 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \land \diamond (AC) lands\_at(BRU)
                       \wedge \Box \neg distress\_decl(CRW)
                       \wedge \Box \neg urgency\_decl(CRW)
                       \wedge \Box \neg endanger\_decl(CRW, TFC)
PROOF:
   Since we do not find contrary information in the sources, we may adopt \langle 1215 \rangle as hypothesis.
\langle 1 \rangle 6. \langle 1216 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \land current(appr\_plate[this\_approach])
                       \land current(appr\_plate[FRA])
   Since we do not find contrary information in the sources, we may adopt \langle 1216 \rangle as hypothesis.
\langle 1 \rangle 7. \ (121) \Leftrightarrow \land \ O(Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT))
                     \land \neg Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT)
   (121) is a non-event and therefore we cannot simply express it as a state. According to the
   principle of contrastive explanation we need to state that some action awaited to be done
   was not executed.
\langle 1 \rangle 8. \ (Hypotheses \land Procedures) \implies \Diamond (121)
    \langle 2 \rangle 1. Hypotheses
   Proof:
        \langle 3 \rangle 1. \{1211\}
       Proof:
            \{1211\} under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 1 is true from the sources.
        \langle 3 \rangle 2. \langle 1212 \rangle
       PROOF:
           \langle 1212 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 2 is true from the sources.
        \langle 3 \rangle 3. [1213]
       PROOF:
           [1213] under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 3 is true from the sources.
        \langle 3 \rangle 4. (1214)
       Proof:
           (1214) under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 4 is true from the sources.
        \langle 3 \rangle 5. \langle 1215 \rangle
       PROOF:
           \langle 1215 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 5 is true from the sources.
        \langle 3 \rangle 6. \langle 1216 \rangle
       Proof:
           \langle 1216 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 6 is true from the sources.
        \langle 3 \rangle 7. Q.E.D.
           Follows by (\land - intro) from \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 3 \rangle 3, \langle 3 \rangle 4, \langle 3 \rangle 5 and \langle 3 \rangle 6. \square
    \langle 2 \rangle 2. Procedures
   PROOF:
       \langle 3 \rangle 1. \land PARDIA-Axioms.Spec
                \land Landing\_Specs.Spec
       Proof:
           We assume that the procedures are implemented as specified in PARDIA-Axioms. Spec
           and Landing_Specs.Spec.
    \langle 2 \rangle 3. (Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \succ \Diamond (121)
   Proof:
        \langle 3 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA}(Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \Rightarrow \Diamond (121)
       PROOF:
```

```
\langle 4 \rangle 1. (121) \Rightarrow \Diamond (121)
PROOF:
  Follows by ♦-intro.
         \land Perceive(BATC, addressing_error(CRW, BATC))
          \land Attend(CRW, data_inconsist(appr_plate[this_approach][LOC[freq]]),
                                                      appr\_plate[FRA][LOC[freq]]))
          \land Attend(CRW, Bruno Vor[freq] \not\in Navaids[appr_plate[this_approach]])
          \land \neg question(BATC, CRW, addressing\_error(CRW, BATC))
          \land current(appr\_plate[this\_approach])
\langle 4 \rangle 2.
          \land current(appr\_plate[FRA])
          \land \quad \diamondsuit(AC)lands\_at(BRU)
          \land \Box \neg distress\_decl(CRW)
          \land \Box \neg urgency\_decl(CRW)
          \land \Box \neg endanger\_decl(CRW, TFC)
          \land \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec
          \land \Box Landing\_Specs.Spec
            \land O(Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT))
                \neg Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT)
Proof:
             \land \Leftrightarrow (AC)lands\_at(BRU)
             \land current(appr\_plate[this\_approach])
             \land current(appr\_plate[FRA])
             \land \Box \neg distress\_decl(CRW)
             \land \Box \neg urgency\_decl(CRW)
             \land \Box \neg endanger\_decl(CRW, TFC)
             \land \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec
             \land \Box Landing\_Specs.Spec
          \Rightarrow \neg Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT)
   PROOF:
                \land \Box Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT)
                \wedge \Box \neg distress\_decl(CRW)
                \land \Box \neg urgency\_decl(CRW)
                \land \quad \Box \neg endanger\_decl(CRW, TFC)
                \land \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec
                \land \Box Landing\_Specs.Spec
      Proof:
                 (\land \Box Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT))
                  \land \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec
                \Rightarrow APT \neq destAPT
         Proof:
            This is an axiom (PARDIA-Axioms.A12)!
                   \land APT \neq destAPT
                    \land \quad \Box \neg distress\_decl(CRW)
                   \land \Box \neg urgency\_decl(CRW)
                   \land \Box \neg endanger\_decl(CRW, TFC)
                   \land \Box Landing\_Specs.Spec
         PROOF:
            This is a rule (Landing_Norms.Normal-Progress).
         \langle 7 \rangle3. Q.E.D.
            PARDIA-Axioms and NormalProgress hold in the nearest possible world, in
            which A holds. (6)1 therefore follows by (\land-intro) from \langle 7 \rangle 1 and \langle 7 \rangle 2. \square
      \langle 6 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
```

```
With: A \triangleq Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT)
                      B \triangleq \Diamond(AC)lands\_at(APT)
             we can also derive \neg B by a derived inference rule: A \Box \rightarrow \neg B
             But we know that B occurred.
              Therefore by modus tollens we can derive \neg A.
                  \land Attend(CRW, data_inconsist(appr_plate[this_approach][LOC[freq]]),
                                                                     appr\_plate[FRA][LOC[freq]]))
                  \land current(appr\_plate[this\_approach])
                  \land current(appr\_plate[FRA])
                  \land \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec
                  \land \Box Landing\_Specs.Spec
               \Rightarrow O(Attend(CRW, apt \neq destAPT))
      PROOF:
          \langle 6 \rangle 1. \ O(Procs)
          Proof:
             This is an EL-Axiom (cf. Axiom 10).
                      \land Attend(CRW, data_inconsist(appr_plate[this_approach][LOC[freq]]),
                                                                        appr\_plate[FRA][LOC[freq]]))
                      \land current(appr\_plate[this\_approach])
                      \land current(appr\_plate[FRA])
                     \land \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec
                    \land \quad \Box Landing\_Specs.Spec
                  \Rightarrow Attend(CRW, APT \neq destAPT)
                         Attend(CRW, data\_inconsist(appr\_plate[this\_approach][LOC[freq]], \\ appr\_plate[FRA][LOC[freq]])) \\ \land \quad \Box PARDIA-Axioms.Spec 
                     \Rightarrow data\_inconsist(appr\_plate[this\_approach][LOC[freq]],
                                                   appr\_plate[FRA][LOC[freq]]))
             Proof:
                 This is an Axiom (PARDIA-Axioms.A12).
                         \land \quad data\_inconsist(appr\_plate[this\_approach][LOC[freq]],\\
                              appr\_plate[FRA][LOC[freq]])
                         \land \quad current(appr\_plate[this\_approach])
                         \land current(appr\_plate[FRA])
                         \land \Box Landing\_Specs.Spec
                     \Rightarrow (APT \neq destAPT)
                 This is a rule (Landing_Norms. UniqueApproachPlates).
              \langle 7 \rangle3. Q.E.D.
                 Follows by (\land-intro) from \langle 7 \rangle 1 and \langle 7 \rangle 2. \square
          \langle 6 \rangle3. Q.E.D.
             Follows from EL (SDL Rule K_O): O(A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow (O(A) \Rightarrow O(B))
      \langle 5 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
          Follows by (\land-intro) from \langle 5 \rangle 1 and \langle 5 \rangle 2. \square
   \langle 4 \rangle3. Q.E.D.
      Insertion of interpretations from \langle 1 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 2, \langle 1 \rangle 3, \langle 1 \rangle 4, \langle 1 \rangle 5, \langle 1 \rangle 6, \langle 2 \rangle 2 and \langle 1 \rangle 7 into
      \langle 3 \rangle 1. \square
\langle 3 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
```

Follows by definit	tion of strict implie	cation (Inferenc	e Rule 14.21). □	

 $\langle 2 \rangle 4. \Leftrightarrow (121)$

Proof:

This is a fact explicitly given in the sources. $\langle 2 \rangle 5$. Q.E.D.

Directly follows by Inference Rule 15.7 from $\langle 2 \rangle 1$, $\langle 2 \rangle 2$, $\langle 2 \rangle 3$ and $\langle 2 \rangle 4$. \square

22.2.7 Proof of Node 2

Nodes used in the following module:

```
    (2) /* AC in BATC area */
    (3) /* AC in LATC area */
    (21) /* LATC procedures */
    (22) /* LATC uses false flight data for NW052 */
```

- module $\langle 2 \rangle$ _is_explained_causally_sufficient -

VARIABLES

extends SOP_Specs CONSTANTS AC, BATC, LATC

```
\begin{array}{ccc} \textit{Hypotheses} & \triangleq & \land \langle 22 \rangle \\ & & \land \langle 3 \rangle \\ \textit{Procedures} & \triangleq & \langle 21 \rangle \end{array}
```

THEOREM (Hypotheses \land Procedures) $\Box \Rightarrow \Diamond \langle 2 \rangle$

Proof:

$$\langle 1 \rangle 1. \ \langle 22 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \left(\begin{array}{ccc} \wedge & fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU` \\ \wedge & nextATC(AC) = BATC \\ \wedge & responsibleATC(`BRU`) = BATC \\ \wedge & destAPT(AC) = `FRA` \end{array} \right)$$

Proof:

We interpret "false flightdata" as deviation of the used data - determined (det) from the ATCs FDC - from the original data. All we use from the flighdata is the information on the AC's destination airport. This piece of information usually suffices to calculate a flight route containing the start and landing ATCCs as well as all intermediate ATCCs. We do not specify this process at this point and define this information as a part of the conjunct describing $\langle 22 \rangle$ instead.

```
\langle 1 \rangle 2. \langle 3 \rangle \Leftrightarrow (AC) in\_area(LATC)
PROOF:
```

We interpret $\langle 3 \rangle$ as a state predicate.

 $\langle 1 \rangle 3. \langle 21 \rangle \Rightarrow SOP_Specs.ATC-Responsibility-Rule$ PROOF:

In the sources the *Procedures* are assumed to be implemented correctly. We claim *SOP_Specs.ATC—Responsibilit* is sufficient to explain the ATC procedures significant for this case.

```
\langle 1 \rangle 4. (Hypotheses \land Procedures) \Longrightarrow \Diamond \langle 2 \rangle
\langle 2 \rangle 1. Hypotheses
PROOF:
\langle 3 \rangle 1. \langle 22 \rangle
PROOF:
\langle 22 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 1 is true from the sources.
```

```
\langle 3 \rangle 2. \langle 3 \rangle
     PROOF:
            \langle 3 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 2 is true from the sources.
      \langle 3 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
           \wedge-intro from \langle 3 \rangle 1 and \langle 3 \rangle 2. \square
\langle 2 \rangle 2. Procedures
Proof:
      \langle 3 \rangle 1. \langle 21 \rangle
     Proof:
            \langle 21 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 3 is true from the sources.
      \langle 3 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
           Follows immediately from \langle 3 \rangle 1.
\langle 2 \rangle 3. (Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \succ \Diamond \langle 2 \rangle
PROOF:
      \langle 3 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA}(Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \Rightarrow \Diamond \langle 2 \rangle
     PROOF:
           We argue in the forward sense of natural deduction.
           We reformulate this expression in logic. Formulation of the goal as well as use of the
           logical equivalents defined above results in:
           \langle 4 \rangle 1. \begin{pmatrix} \wedge & fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU` \\ \wedge & nextATC(AC) = BATC \\ \wedge & responsibleATC(`BRU`) = BATC \\ \wedge & destAPT(AC) = `FRA` \\ \wedge & (AC)in\_area(LATC) \\ \wedge & \Box ATC\_Responsibility\_Rule \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \Diamond (AC)in\_area(BATC) 
                 \langle 5 \rangle 1. \begin{pmatrix} \land & fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU` \\ \land & nextATC(AC) = BATC \\ \land & responsibleATC(`BRU`) = BATC \\ \land & destAPT(AC) = `FRA` \\ \land & (AC)in\_area(LATC) \\ \land & \Box SOP\_Specs.ATC-Responsibility-Rule \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \Diamond Handoff(LATC, BATC, AC) 
                       ROOF:

\langle 6 \rangle 1. \left( \begin{array}{c} \wedge & (AC)in\_area(LATC) \\ \wedge & \Box ATC\_Responsibility\_Rule \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow EnRouteProcessing(LATC, AC)
                       Proof:
                             Follows by STL2 and Propositional Logic from
                             SOP\_Specs.ATC-Responsibility-Rule.
                                          \land EnRouteProcessing(LATC, AC)
                      \langle 6 \rangle 2. \begin{pmatrix} \wedge & EnRouteProcessing(LATC, AC) \\ \wedge & (AC)in\_area(LATC) \\ \wedge & fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU' \\ \wedge & nextATC(AC) = BATC \\ \wedge & responsibleATC(`BRU') = BATC \\ \wedge & destAPT(AC) = `FRA' \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \Diamond Handoff(LATC, BATC, AC)
PROOF:
\langle 7 \rangle 1. \begin{pmatrix} \wedge & det\_destAPT(AC) = `BRU' \\ \wedge & fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU' \\ \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow det\_destAPT(AC) = fdata(AC)[destAPT]
```

```
Proof:
                             Follows by SOP_Specs.DetermineDestinationProcedure.
                                             \land fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU` \  \  ) \Rightarrow LATC \neq det\_destATC(AC) 
                                          \checkmark \land det\_destAPT(AC) = `BRU`
                                                 (\land det\_destAPT(AC) = `BRU` 
 \land responsibleATC(`BRU`) = BATC) \Rightarrow (det\_destATC(AC) = BATC)
                             \langle 8 \rangle 1.
                             Proof:
                                     Follows immediately from SOP_SPECS.RespDestATC_Determination_Rule.
                             \langle 8 \rangle 2. BATC \neq LATC
                             Proof:
                                     We now from the sources that this is true.
                             \langle 8 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
                                     Follows by Propositional Logic from \langle 8 \rangle 1 and \langle 8 \rangle 2.
                                               \land EnRouteProcessing(LATC, AC)
                                               \land \quad (AC)in\_area(LATC) \\ \land \quad det\_destAPT(AC) = fdata(AC)[destAPT] 
                                             \land LATC \neq det\_destATC(AC)
                                             \diamond Handoff(LATC, nextATC, AC)
                     Proof:
                             Follows by Propositional Logic.
                                          (\land \diamond Handoff(LATC, nextATC(AC), AC))) \Rightarrow \diamond Handoff(LATC, BATC, AC)
                                             \land nextATC(AC) = BATC
                     Proof:
                             Follows by Propositional Logic.
                      \langle 7 \rangle 5. Q.E.D.
                             Follows by Propositional Logic (transitivity of \Rightarrow) from \langle 7 \rangle 1, \langle 7 \rangle 2, \langle 7 \rangle 3 and
                             \langle 7 \rangle 4. \sqcup
              \langle 6 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
                     Follows by Propositional logic from \langle 6 \rangle 1 and \langle 6 \rangle 2.
       \langle 5 \rangle 2. \Leftrightarrow Handoff(LATC, BATC, AC) \Rightarrow \Diamond(AC) in\_area(BATC)
      Proof:
                                                     (AC)in\_area(LATC)
                                              \land (AC)in\_area(BATC)
                                             \land (AC) in\_treat(BATC) 
 \land nextATC(AC) = BATC 
 \land (AC) in\_area(LATC) 
 \land (AC) in\_area(BATC) 
 \land (AC) in\_area(BA
                               \Rightarrow \Diamond(AC)in_area(BATC)
              PROOF:
                     Follows immediately by Propositional Logic.
              \langle 6 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
              Proof:
                     Insertion of definition of SOP\_Specs.Handoff(LATC, BATC, AC)
                     into \langle 5 \rangle 2.
       \langle 5 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
              Follows by Propositional logic from \langle 5 \rangle 1 and \langle 5 \rangle 2. \square
\langle 4 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
      Insertion of interpretations from \langle 1 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 2, and \langle 1 \rangle 3 into \langle 2 \rangle 3.
```

```
\langle 3 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
        Follows by definition of strict implication (inference rule 14.21). \square
\langle 2 \rangle 4. \Leftrightarrow \langle 2 \rangle
PROOF:
    This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
\langle 2 \rangle 5. \ \Box \neg \langle 2 \rangle \ \Box \rightarrow \neg (Hypotheses \land Procedures)
Proof:
   \langle 3 \rangle 1. \ \Box \neg (AC) in\_area(BATC) \ \Box \rightarrow \left( \begin{array}{c} \lor \ \neg (AC) in\_area(LATC) \\ \lor \ \neg SOP\_Specs.ATC\_Responsibility\_Rule \\ \lor \ \neg fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU` \\ \lor \ \neg nextATC(AC) = BATC \\ \lor \ \neg responsibleATC(`BRU`) = BATC \\ \lor \ \neg destAPT(AC) = `FRA` \end{array} \right)
    PROOF:
        We argue, that in the nearest possible world the flight data is wrong at BATC. Under
        this assumption, all possible consequences (\neg fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU'), (\neg nextATC(AC) =
        BATC), (\neg responsible ATC(`BRU`) = BATC) and (\neg dest APT(AC) = `FRA`) will
        lead to \neg (AC)in\_area(BATC).
    \langle 3 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
        Follows by Propositional Logic, STL2 and STL3 as well as use of definitions from (2)1
        and \langle 2 \rangle 2.
\langle 2 \rangle 6. Q.E.D.
    Directly follows by Inference Rule 15.7 from \langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 2 \rangle 2, \langle 2 \rangle 3, \langle 2 \rangle 4. Land \langle 2 \rangle 5. \Box
```

Remarks:

Possible to specify FDP-Procedures as a table based on *Letters of agreement* between ATCCs. (Example Nolan p.413)

22.2.8 Proof of Node 22

Nodes used in the following module:

```
\langle 22 \rangle /* LATC uses false flight data for NW052 */ [221] /* London received false data from SATC */
```

```
PROOF:
```

```
\langle 1 \rangle 1. [221] \Longrightarrow \langle 22 \rangle
    \langle 2 \rangle 1. [221] \Rightarrow \langle 22 \rangle
   Proof:
        \langle 3 \rangle 1. [221] \land \langle 22 \rangle
        PROOF:
             \langle 4 \rangle 1. [221]
            PROOF: This is a fact assumed in the sources.
             \langle 4 \rangle 2. \langle 22 \rangle
            PROOF: This is a fact assumed in the sources.
            \langle 4 \rangle3. Q.E.D.
                 (\land-introduction) from \langle 4 \rangle 1 and \langle 4 \rangle 2.
        \langle 3 \rangle 2. \neg [221] \square \rightarrow \neg \langle 22 \rangle
        PROOF:
             In the nearest possible world the transfer of flight data would have occurred as specified
            in TLA-module This_ATCcomm_history. Assuming a correct transmission (\neg[221]), we
            can derive:
               \neg |221|
                                     StoL_{correct}
                             \Rightarrow
                                     UNCHANGED persistent_data
                                     \neg \langle 22 \rangle
        \langle 3 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
            Directly follows by Inference Rule 14.20 from \langle 3 \rangle 1 and \langle 3 \rangle 2.
    \langle 2 \rangle 2. \neg \langle 22 \rangle \Box \rightarrow \neg [221]
```

In the nearest possible world transmitting correct data is greater more probable than making several incorrect handoffs resulting in finally the same correct flightdata. According to the specification of *This_ATCcomm_history*, we can infer:

```
\neg \langle 22 \rangle \Rightarrow persistent\_data[destination]' = "FRA"
```

Therefore:

```
( \land persistent\_data[destination]' = \text{``FRA''} ) \Rightarrow \text{UNCHANGED } persistent\_data \\ \land persistent\_data[destination] = \text{``FRA''} ) \Rightarrow StoL_{correct} \\ \Rightarrow \neg [221]
```

⟨2⟩3. Q.E.D. Follows by definition of " \Longrightarrow " and from steps ⟨2⟩1 and ⟨2⟩2. \Box

22.2.9 Proof of Node 3

Nodes used in the following module:

- $\langle 3 \rangle$ /* AC in LATC area */
- (31) /* SATC handoff procedures under this flightplan are to LATC */
- (32) /* FI is correct at SATC */
- $\langle 4 \rangle$ /* AC in SATC area */

- $\mathbf{module} \langle \mathcal{J} \rangle_{is_explained_causally_sufficient}$.

VARIABLES

extends SOP_Specs

Constants AC, destAPT, APT, SATC, LATC, BATC

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \textit{Hypotheses} & \triangleq & \land \langle 32 \rangle \\ & & \land \langle 4 \rangle \\ \textit{Procedures} & \triangleq & \langle 31 \rangle \end{array}$$

THEOREM (Hypotheses \land Procedures) $\Longrightarrow \diamondsuit\langle 3 \rangle$

Proof:

$$\begin{array}{l} \langle 1 \rangle 1. \ \langle 32 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \left(\begin{array}{ccc} \wedge & fdata(ac)[destAPT] = det_destATP(AC) \\ & = destAP(AC) = `FRA' \\ \wedge & nextATC(AC) = LATC \\ \wedge & responsibleATC(`BRU') = BATC \end{array} \right)$$

Proof:

All we use from the flighdata is the information on the AC's destination airport. This piece of information usually suffices to calculate a flight route containing the start and landing ATCCs as well as all intermediate ATCCs. We do not specify this process at this point and define this information as a part of the conjunct describing $\langle 32 \rangle$ instead.

$$\langle 1 \rangle 2. \ \langle 4 \rangle \Leftrightarrow (AC) in_area(SATC)$$

Proof:

We interpret $\langle 4 \rangle$ as a state predicate.

$$\langle 1 \rangle 3. \ \langle 31 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \left(\begin{array}{cc} \wedge & nextATC(AC) = LATC \\ \wedge & SOP_Specs.Spec \end{array} \right)$$

PROOF:

Our interpretation of $\langle 31 \rangle$ is that generally the procedures are followed as specified in SOP_Specs that therefore the next ATCC the flightdata will be sent to, is LATC.

 $\langle 1 \rangle 4$. (Hypotheses \land Procedures) $\Longrightarrow \Diamond \langle 3 \rangle$

 $\langle 2 \rangle 1$. Hypotheses

PROOF:

 $\langle 3 \rangle 1. \langle 32 \rangle$

PROOF:

 $\langle 32 \rangle$ under the interpretation of $\langle 1 \rangle 1$ is true from the sources.

 $\langle 3 \rangle 2. \langle 3 \rangle$

Proof:

```
\langle 4 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 2 is true from the sources.
     \langle 3 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
          \wedge-intro from \langle 3 \rangle 1 and \langle 3 \rangle 2.
\langle 2 \rangle 2. Procedures
Proof:
     \langle 3 \rangle 1. \langle 31 \rangle
     Proof:
           \langle 31 \rangle under the interpretation of \langle 1 \rangle 3 is true from the sources.
     \langle 3 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
          Follows immediately from \langle 3 \rangle 1. \Box
\langle 2 \rangle 3. \ (Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \succ \Diamond \langle 3 \rangle
PROOF:
     \langle 3 \rangle 1. \vdash_{TLA}(Hypotheses \land \Box Procedures) \Rightarrow \Diamond \langle 3 \rangle
     PROOF:
          We argue in the forward sense of natural deduction.
          We reformulate this expression in logic. Formulation of the goal as well as use of the
          logical equivalents defined above results in:
                                     fdata(ac)[destAPT] = det\_destATP(AC)
           \langle 4 \rangle 1. \begin{pmatrix} \land & \text{jaunature juces LAT } I_1 = \text{aet-destal } P(AC) \\ & = \text{dest} AP(AC) = `FRA' \\ & \land & \text{next} ATC(AC) = LATC \\ & \land & \text{responsible\_atc}(`BRU`) = BATC \\ & \land & (AC)\text{in\_area}(SATC) \\ & \land & \Box \text{next} ATC(AC) = LATC \\ & \land & \Box SOP\_Specs.Spec \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \Diamond (AC)\text{in\_area}(LATC) 
                                           fdata(ac)[destAPT] = det\_destATP(AC)
               \langle 5 \rangle 1. \begin{cases} \wedge & faata(ac)[aestAPT] = aet\_aestATP(AC) \\ & = destAP(AC) = `FRA' \\ \wedge & nextATC(AC) = LATC \\ \wedge & (AC)in\_area(SATC) \\ \wedge & \Box nextATC(AC) = LATC \\ \wedge & \Box SOP\_Specs.Spec \\ \Rightarrow \Diamond Inter\_ATC\_Handoff(SATC, LATC, AC) \end{cases}
                Proof:
                                    \left( \begin{array}{cc} \land & (AC)in\_area(SATC) \\ \land & \Box SOP\_Specs.Spec \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow EnRouteProcessing(SATC,AC) 
                     PROOF:
                           Follows by STL2 and Propositional Logic from
                           SOP\_Specs.ATC-Responsibility-Rule.
                                      ' \land EnRouteProcessing(SATC, AC)
                                         \land \quad fdata(ac)[destAPT] = det\_destATP(AC)
                     \langle 6 \rangle 2. \begin{cases} \wedge \int dut d(dc)[ucsdT] = uct\_acstTT \\ = destAP(AC) = 'FRA' \\ \wedge nextATC(AC) = LATC \\ \wedge responsible\_atc('BRU') = BATC \\ \wedge (AC)in\_area(SATC) \\ \wedge \Box nextATC(AC) = LATC \\ \wedge \Box SOP\_Specs.Spec \end{cases}
                                        \Rightarrow \Diamond Inter\_ATC\_Handoff(SATC, LATC, AC)
```

```
Proof:
           \langle 7 \rangle 1. \ (fdata(ac)[destAPT] = det\_destATP(AC) = destAP(AC) = FRA')
                   \Rightarrow SATC \neq det\_destATC(AC)
                          \begin{pmatrix} \land & fdata(ac)[destAPT] = det\_destATP(AC) \\ & = destAP(AC) = `FRA` \\ \land & responsible\_atc(`BRU`) = BATC \end{pmatrix} 
                       \Rightarrow (det\_destATC(AC) = BATC)
              PROOF:
                  Follows immediately from SOP_Specs.RespDestATC_Determination_Rule.
               \langle 8 \rangle 2. BATC \neq SATC
              Proof:
                  We now from the sources that this is true.
              \langle 8 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
                  PROOF: Follows by Propositional Logic from \langle 8 \rangle 1 and \langle 8 \rangle 2.
                       \land EnRouteProcessing(SATC, AC)
                        \land (AC)in\_area(SATC)
                        \land fdata(ac)[destAPT] = det\_destATP(AC)
                             = destAP(AC) = FRA'
                       \land SATC \neq det\_destATC(AC)
                   \Rightarrow \Diamond Inter\_ATC\_Handoff(SATC, nextATC, AC)
           PROOF:
              Follows by Propositional Logic.
                     (\land \diamond Inter\_ATC\_Handoff(SATC, nextATC(AC), AC)) \Rightarrow
                      \wedge \quad \Box nextATC(AC) = LATC
                   \Rightarrow \Diamond Inter\_ATC\_Handoff(SATC, LATC, AC)
           Proof:
              Follows by STL2 and Propositional Logic. \square
           \langle 7 \rangle 4. Q.E.D.
              Follows by Propositional Logic (transitivity of \Rightarrow) from \langle 7 \rangle 1, \langle 7 \rangle 2 and \langle 7 \rangle 3.
       \langle 6 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
           Follows by Propositional logic from \langle 6 \rangle 1 and \langle 6 \rangle 2.
   \langle 5 \rangle 2. \diamond Inter\_ATC\_Handoff(SATC, LATC, AC) \Rightarrow \diamond (AC)in\_area(LATC)
   Proof:
                          (AC)in\_area(SATC)
                       \land (AC)in\_area(LATC)
                       \land \Box nextATC(AC) = LATC 
 \land \Diamond \begin{pmatrix} \land \neg (AC)in\_area(SATC) \\ \land (AC)in\_area(LATC) \end{pmatrix} 
 \land \begin{pmatrix} \lor ATCcomm\_history.Handoff_{correct}(SATC, LATC, fid(AC)) \\ \lor ATCcomm\_history.Handoff_{incorrect}(SATC, LATC, fid(AC)) \end{pmatrix} 
               \Rightarrow \Diamond(AC)in_area(LATC)
       Proof:
           Follows immediately by Propositional Logic.
       \langle 6 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
       PROOF:
           Insertion of definition of SOP_Specs.Inter_ATC_Handoff(SATC, LATC, AC)
           into \langle 5 \rangle 2.
   \langle 5 \rangle 3. Q.E.D.
       Follows by Propositional logic from \langle 5 \rangle 1 and \langle 5 \rangle 2.
\langle 4 \rangle 2. Q.E.D.
```

Insertion of interpretations from $\langle 1 \rangle 1$, $\langle 1 \rangle 2$, and $\langle 1 \rangle 3$ into $\langle 2 \rangle 3$.
$\langle 3 \rangle 2$. Q.E.D.
Follows by definition of strict implication (inference rule 14.21). \square
$\langle 2 \rangle 4. \Diamond \langle 3 \rangle$
Proof:
This is a fact explicitly given in the sources.
(2)5. Q.E.D.
Directly follows by Inference Rule 15.7 from $\langle 2 \rangle 1$. $\langle 2 \rangle 2$. $\langle 2 \rangle 3$ and $\langle 2 \rangle 4$.

22.2.10 The Full Explanations

Finally we can summarize all *proof obligations* (assumptions we made for the proof). Given the truth of these assumptions, *it follows by logic alone* that the explanation of the incident we gave is correct and sufficient.

$\operatorname{\mathbf{-}\, module}\, \mathit{Proof-Obligations}$ -

THEOREM

History $\langle 4 \rangle \hookrightarrow \langle 3 \rangle \hookrightarrow \langle 2 \rangle \hookrightarrow [1]$ is completely explained (according to our definitions), **iff**

- 1. our specifications are sufficient to explain the part of the world we needed to focus on. We defined
 - A Hierarchy of Communication Procedures:
 - ATCtrans:
 - Specification of the communication channel between ATCCs.
 - ATCproc:
 - Specification of low level communication functions of one ATCC.
 - ATCcomm:
 - Specification of medium level communication functions (Handoff) from one ATCC to another.
 - ATCcomm_history:
 Specification of higher level communication functions between ATCCs.
 - This_ATCcomm_history: Specification of higher level communication functions between ATCCs for this special history.
 - Cognitive Procedures:
 - PARDIA_Axioms:

Specification of axioms stating the relationships between the attitudes of the PARDIA model.

- PARDIA_Norms:
 - Specification of certain PARDIA principles which are intended to hold.
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs):
 - AC_ATC_comm.spec: Specification of Communication Procedures between Aircrafts and ATCCs.
 - Landing_Axioms:
 General specification of domain rules, which are valid at all times.

- Landing_Norms:
 Specification of SOPs concerning the landing.
- Landing_Specs: Specification of rules to be kept in the landing phase (mainly Landing_Axioms and Landing_Norms).
- SOP_Specs:
 Specification of the part of SOPs that covers an ATCCs responsibility for evaluation and transmission of flight data.
- TLA-Specifications of mathematical functions which describe the behaviour of physical flight parameters over a peroid of time, like altitude for example:
 - RealTimeTheorems
- 2. these specifications are fullfilled in every case in which no contrary information is explicitly given.
- 3. our TLA interpretions of the text correspond sufficiently to the reality. We assumed:
 - $\Box \neg ATC_breakoff$
 - $[11] \Leftrightarrow Decide(CRW, \Box(AC)in_landing_phase)$
 - $\langle 12 \rangle \Rightarrow (AC)near(BRU)$
 - $[111] \Rightarrow (APT \neq destAPT)$
 - $[1111] \Leftrightarrow \diamondsuit visual_contact(crw, apt)$
 - $[11111] \Leftrightarrow below_clouds(ac)$
 - $\langle 11112 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \wedge ILS_approach(ac, apt) \\ \wedge \Box \neg CRW_breakoff(crw, appr)$
 - $\langle 2 \rangle \Leftrightarrow (ac)in_area(atc)$
 - ⟨21⟩ ⇒ SOP_Specs.ATC—Responsibility—Rule
 In the sources the Procedures are assumed to be implemented
 correctly. We claim SOP_Specs.ATC—Responsibility—Rule is
 sufficient to explain the ATC procedures significant for this case.

•
$$\langle 22 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \begin{pmatrix} \wedge & fdata(ac)[destAPT] = `BRU` \\ \wedge & nextATC(AC) = BATC \\ \wedge & responsibleATC(`BRU`) = BATC \\ \wedge & destAPT(AC) = `FRA` \end{pmatrix}$$

We interpret "false flightdata" as deviation of the used data determined from the ATCs FDC - from the original data. All we use from the flightdata is the information on the AC's destination airport. This piece of information usually suffices to calculate a flight route containing the start and landing ATCCs as well as all intermediate ATCCs. We do not specify this process at this point and define this information as a part of the conjuncts describing $\langle 22 \rangle$ and $\langle 32 \rangle$ instead.

- $\langle 3 \rangle \Leftrightarrow (AC)in_area(LATC)$
- $\langle 31 \rangle \Leftrightarrow \begin{pmatrix} \wedge & nextATC(AC) = LATC \\ \wedge & SOP_Specs.Spec \end{pmatrix}$ Our interpretation of $\langle 31 \rangle$ is that generally the procedures are

Our interpretation of $\langle 31 \rangle$ is that generally the procedures are followed as specified in SOP_Specs that therefore the next ATCC the flightdata will be sent to, is LATC.

- $\langle 4 \rangle \Leftrightarrow (AC)in_area(SATC)$
- 4. several assumptions used in the modal part of proofs of [111], $\langle 12 \rangle$ and $\langle 22 \rangle$ are correct:
 - Instruments providing the information necessary to determine the position without visual contact were ignored. Therefore the only other way to obtain this information is visual contact. (used in[111])
 - The evidence of the instruments was ignored. Thus, if they hadn't recognized the layout they saw was different from the expected (flight documents contain 2D maps of the fact of the destination airport) they wouldn't have recognized their mistake at that time.- (used in[111])
 - No use of evidence from instrumentation was made. If neither [1111] nor {1112} then no evident was available that could call their attention to the wrong airport.- (used in[111])
 - The flight destination was Frankfurt. If the Crew had realized they were on the wrong course, they would likely have taken actions to return to the course they were supposed to be on unless other more pressing considerations intervened.- (used in(12))
 - In this particular case we assume that an AC only enters a specific area when it has obtained an ATC clearance before. Therefore without a clearance to BATC area the AC will not be able to get into Brussels Airport area.- (used in\lambda12\rangle)
 - Since they are assumed to follow the SOPs in the nearest possible world, they would have realized hints about a possible wrong course.(used in(12))

22.3 The Final WB-Graph

Given the proof we just finished, we're now able to provide the textual and pictorial form of the causally sufficient WB-Graph, in Figure 22.4 and Figure 22.5 respectively.

```
- module WB-Graph_is_causally_sufficient -
DECLARATION
   [1]_suff \stackrel{\triangle}{=} instance [1]_is_explained_causally_sufficient
   [11]_suff \stackrel{\triangle}{=} instance [11]_is_explained_causally_sufficient
   [111]_suff \triangleq instance [111]_is_explained_causally_sufficient
   [1111]_suff \triangleq instance [111]_is_explained_causally_sufficient
   \langle 12 \rangle_suff \triangleq instance \langle 1112 \rangle_is_explained_causally_sufficient
   (121)_suff \triangleq instance (11121)_is_explained_causally_sufficient
   \langle 2 \rangle_suff \triangleq instance \langle 2 \rangle_is_explained_causally_sufficient
   \langle 22 \rangle_suff \triangleq instance \langle 22 \rangle_is_explained_causally_sufficient
   \langle 3 \rangle_suff \stackrel{\triangle}{=} instance \langle 3 \rangle_is_explained_causally_sufficient
DEFINITION
   THEOREM \wedge [1]_suff.THEOREM
                 \wedge [11]_suff.Theorem
                 \wedge [111]_suff.Theorem
                 \wedge [1111]_suff.THEOREM
                 \wedge \langle 12 \rangle_suff. Theorem
                 \wedge (121)_suff. Theorem
                 \wedge \langle 2 \rangle_{suff}. Theorem
                 \wedge \langle 22 \rangle_suff. Theorem
                 \wedge \langle 3 \rangle_{suff}. Theorem
```

Figure 22.3: Top-Level Module of the Proof

```
[1] /* AC lands at Brussels RWY 25 */
 /\[-.1] /* CRW opts to continue landing */
 /\<-.2> /* AC near Brussels Airport */
 [1.1] /[-.1] /* CRW realizes they are landing at the wrong airport */
       /\<-.2> /* CRW has safety reasons for continuing landing */
       /\[-.3] /* Standard Operating Procedures */
    [1.1.1] /\[-.1] /* CRW gets visual contact to Brussels airport */
            /\{-.2} /* CRW notices that Brussels' airport layout is different
                      from Frankfurt's */
      [1.1.1.1] /\[-.1] /* AC breaks out under clouds */
                /\<-.2> /* CRW procedures */
                /\<1.2>
                 /\<2> /* AC in BATC area */
       <2> /\<-.1> /* LATC procedures */
           /\<-.2> /* LATC uses false flight data for NW052 */
           /\<3> /* AC in LATC area */
         <2.2> [-.1] /* London received false data from SATC */
         <3> /\<-.1> /* SATC handoff procedures under this flightplan
                         are to LATC */
             /\<-.2> /* FI is correct at SATC */
             /\<4> /* AC in SATC area */
 <1.2> /(-.1) /* CRW did not realize that they were on wrong course,
                  UNTIL:[111] */
       /\<-.2> /* AC cleared to BATC according to ATC procedures */
   (1.2.1) /\{-.1} /* CRW addresses BATC controller as ''Frankfurt''
                      several times */
           /\<-.2> /* ILS has different frequency for Frankfurt. */
            /\[-.3] /* CRW asks for the Bruno VOR's frequency. */
            /\(-.4) /* Brussels did not question the addressing error
                       although it happened more than once */
           /\<-.5> /* Situation remains safe during landing */
            /\<-.6> /* Current approach plates are used */
```

Figure 22.4: Textual form of the final WB-Graph




Figure 22.5: Pictorial form of the final WB-Graph